Chung Fook v. White
POSSIBLE NON-MERITS OPINIONChung Fook is a native-born citizen of the United States. Lee Shee, his wife, is an alien Chinese woman, ineligible for naturalization. In 1922 she sought admission to the United States, but was refused and detained at the immigration station, on the ground that she was an alien, afflicted with a dangerous contagious disease. No question is raised as to her alienage or the effect and character of her disease; but the contention is that, nevertheless, she is entitled to admission under the proviso found in § 22 of the Immigration Act of February 5, 1917, c. 29, 39 Stat. 891. The section is copied in the margin. 1
A petition for a writ of habeas corpus was denied by the Federal District Court for the Northern District of California, and upon appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals, the judgment was affirmed. 287 Fed. 533.
The pertinent words of the proviso are: “ That if the person sending for wife or minor children is naturalized, *445 a wife to whom married or a minor child bom subsequent to such husband or father’s naturalization shall be admitted without detention for treatment in hospital, . . . ” The measure of the exemption is plainly stated and, in terms, extends to the wife of a naturalized citizen only.
But it is argued that it cannot be supposed that Congress intended to accord to a naturalized citizen a right and preference beyond that enjoyed by a native-born citizen. The court below thought that the exemption from detention was meant to relate only to a wife who by marriage had acquired her husband’s citizenship, and not to one who, notwithstanding she was married to a citizen, remained an alien under § 1994, Rev. Stats.: “Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the United States, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized, shall be deemed a citizen.” To the same effect, see Ex parte Leong Shee, 275 Fed. 364. We are inclined to agree with this view; but, in any event, the statute plainly relates only to the wife or children of a naturalized citizen and we cannot interpolate the words “ native-born citizen ” without usurping the legislative function. Corona Coal Co. v. United States, 263 U. S. 537; United States v. First National Bank, 234 U. S. 245, 259-260; St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Ry. Co. v. Taylor, 210 U. S. *446 281, 295; Amy v. Watertown, 130 U. S. 320, 327. The words of the statute being clear, if it unjustly discriminates against the native-born citizen, or is cruel and inhuman in its results, as forcefully contended, the remedy lies with Congress and not with the courts. Their duty is simply to enforce the law as it is written, unless clearly unconstitutional.
Affirmed.