United States v. Rock Royal Co-Operative, Inc.

Mr. Justice Reed delivered the opinion of the Court.

These appeals involve the validity of Order No. 27 of the Secretary of Agriculture, issued under the Agricul*540tural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937,1 regulating, the handling of milk in the New York metropolitan area.

On October 27, 1938, the United States of America filed a complaint against the Rock Royal Co-operative, Inc., the Central New York Cooperative Association, Inc., and Schuyler Junction New York Milk Shed Cooperative, Inc., seeking a mandatory injunction requiring the defendants and their representatives to comply with the provisions of the Order. On November 26, 1938, a similar action was filed in the same court against the Jetter Dairy Company, Inc. On December 2 these causes were consolidated. The original proceedings had sought relief not only for violations of the Order of the Secretary of Agriculture but also, if the court should find that the defendants or any of them were not subject to that Order, for violation of Official Order No. 126 issued by the Commissioner of Agriculture and Markets of the State of New York. The two orders are in pari materia, one covering milk moving in or directly burdening, obstructing or affecting interstate commerce and the other2 covering milk in intrastate commerce. Each defendant is a dealer handling milk moving in interstate commerce. On December 15, Holton Y. Noyes, as Commissioner of Agriculture and Markets of the State of New York, was permitted to intervene as a party plaintiff in the consolidated action. He sought an injunction commanding the defendants and their representatives to comply with Order No. 126 or, should it be determined that their milk was not subject to this Order, to comply with the Order of the Secretary of Agriculture.

In their answers, the defendants pleaded certain affirmative defenses, setting up the invalidity of Order No. 27 because ■ of improper efforts to secure its adoption. *541Broadly speaking, these defenses were based upon erroneous representations alleged to have been made by officials and by certain private organizations to bring about the approval of the Order and upon an alleged conspiracy of the same private organizations to create a monopoly by means of the Order. The motion to strike these defenses having been overruled, the Dairymen’s League Cooperative Association, hereinafter called the League, and the Metropolitan Cooperative Milk Producers Bargaining Agency, Inc., hereinafter called the Agency, were permitted to intervene to combat them.

The answers also challenged the two orders and the Act as contrary to the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution and the Act as involving improper delegation of legislative power. The Central New York Cooperative Association denied the power of the Congress to enact the legislation under the Commerce Clause and set up as a further defense that it was not subject to either order.

After a hearing upon the merits, the District Court dismissed the complaints. The state order was eliminated from consideration on the understanding, not questioned here, that the milk of all four defendants is covered by the Federal Order, if valid. It was further held that §§ 8c (5) (B) (ii) and 8c (5) (F) of the Act violate the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment, that the Order is discriminatory and takes property withoút compensation, that approval of the producers was secured by unlawful misrepresentation and coercion and that important provisions of the Order, authorizing payments to cooperative and proprietary handlers, have no basis in the Act. United States v. Rock Royal Co-operative, 26 F. Supp. 534, 548, 550, 544, 545, 553. As the unconstitutionality of certain sections of an Act of Congress was one ground of the decision an appeal was allowed directly to this Court.3

*542The Statute.4 The controversy revolves almost entirely around Order No. 27. Back of the Order is the statute under which it was issued, the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, which reenacted and amended certain provisions of the Agricultural Adjustment Act.5 *543As its-name implies, it was aimed at assisting in the marketing of agricultural commodities.

By § 1 it is declared that “the disruption of the orderly exchange of commodities in interstate commerce impairs *544the purchasing power of farmers” thus destroying the value -of agricultural assets to. the "detriment of the national public interest. This interference is declared to “burden and obstruct the normal channels of interstate commerce.”

*545By§ 2 it is declared to be the policy of Congress, through the exercise of the powers conferred upon the Secretary of Agriculture, “to establish and maintain such orderly marketing conditions for, agricultural commodities in interstate commerce as will establish prices to farmers at a level that will give agricultural commodities *546a purchasing power with respect to articles that farmers buy, equivalent to the purchasing power of agricultural commodities in the base period. . .

Under § 2 of the Act, the base period for agricultural commodities, except tobacco and potatoes, is fixed at the pre-war period of August, 1909, to July, 1914. Where the purchasing power during the base period cannot be satisfactorily determined from available statistics within the Department of Agriculture, the Secretary is authorized to take as the base period from August, 1919, to July, 1929, or a portion thereof. § 8e. In prescribing minimum prices for milk the statute authorizes the Secretary to fix minimum prices without restriction to the purchasing power during the base period so as to reflect the prices of available supplies of feed and other economic conditions, if he finds after a hearing that minimum prices with a base period purchasing power are unreasonable. § 8c (18).

Section 8a (6) gives jurisdiction to the district courts of the United States to enforce and to prevent and restrain any person from violating any of the orders, regulations or agreements under its provisions.

Section 8b authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture to enter into marketing agreements with the producers and others engaged in the handling of agricultural commodities in or affecting interstate commerce. These agreements may be for all agricultural commodities and their products, are entirely voluntary and may cover the handling of the commodity by any person engaged in the various operations of processing or distribution. Agreements are involved only incidentally in this proceeding.

Section 8c provides for a use of orders, instead of agreements, in certain situations. These orders apply only to specified commodities, including milk.6 They are to be . entered only when the Secretary of Agriculture has rea*547son to believe that the issuance of an order will tend to effectuate the declared policy of the Act with respect to any commodity or product thereof, and after notice and an opportunity for hearing. It is necessary also for the Secretary of Agriculture to set forth in such order a- finding upon the evidence introduced at the hearing that the issuance of the Order and the terms and conditions thereof will tend to effectuate the declared policy.7 When, as here, the commodity is milk, the Act requires8 that the Order contain one or more of terms specified in § 8c (5) and no others, except certain terms common to all orders and set out in § 8c (7). These terms, as used in the Order under examination, will be referred to later. Orders may only be issued9 after hearing upon a marketing agreement which regulates the handling of the commodity in the samé manner as the order. Without special determination of the Secretary of Agriculture and approval of the President, orders are not to become effective unless approved by handlers as required by thé Act.10'

Notwithstanding the refusal or failure of handlers to sign a marketing agreement relating to such commodity, the Secretary of Agriculture, with the approval of the President, may issue ,an order without the adoption of an agreement, if he determines that the refusal or failure of the handlers to sign a marketing agreement tends to prevent the effectuation of the declared policy with respect to the commodity and that the issuance of the order is the only practical means of advancing the interest of the producers. In such a case the order must be approved or favored by two-thirds of the producers in number or volume who have been engaged, during a representative period, in the production for market of the *548commodity within the production area or two-thirds of those engaged in- the production of the commodity for sale in the marketing area specified in the marketing agreement or order. § 8c (9). Section 8c (19) authorizes a referendum to determine whether the issuance of the order is approved by the producers. Section 8c (12) provides that the Secretary shall consider the approval or disapproval by any cooperative .association as the approval or disapproval of the producers who are members, stockholders or patrons of the cooperative association.

Section 8c (15) provides for administrative review by the Secretary on petition of a handler objecting to any provision as not in accordance with law and seeking a modification or exemption therefrom. By (15) (B) the district courts have jurisdiction to review such ruling.

The Problem. — In accordance with the provisions of the Act the Secretary of Agriculture, before promulgating Order No. 27, conducted public hearings attended by handlers, producers and consumers of milk and their representatives throughout the milkshed. No defendant, however, was represented. These' hearings followed the presentation by the' Agency to the Secretary and to the Commissioner of a proposed marketing agreement and order regulating the handling' of milk in the New York marketing area with a request for- action under the federal and New York statutes. The hearings were jointly held by the federal and state governments. The cooperation of the two governments was the culmination of a course of investigation and legislation which had continued over many years. The problem from the standpoint of New York was fully considered and the results set out in the Report of 1933 of the Joint Legislative Committee to Investigate the Milk Industry. This investigation was followed by the creatipn of the Milk Control Board with broad powers to regulate the dairy business of the state. This board had power to fix prices to *549be paid to producers and to be charged to consumers.11 A later New York act, the Rogers-Alien Act,12 authorized the state commissioner to cooperate with’ the federal authorities acting under the present Marketing Agreement Act, and to issue orders supplementary to those of the Federal Government to be carried out under joint administration.

The problems concerned with the maintenance and distribution of an adequate supply of milk in metropolitan centers are well understood by producers and handlers. In the milkshed and marketing area of metropolitan New York these problems are peculiarly acute.13 It is generally recognized that the chief cause of fluctuating prices and supplies is the existence of a normal Surplus which is necessary to furnish an adequate amount for peak periods of consumption. This results in an excess of production during the troughs of demand. As milk is highly perishable, a fertile field for the growth of bacteria, and yet an essential item of diet, it is most desirable to have an adequate production under close sanitary supervision to meet the constantly varying needs. The sale of milk in metropolitan New York is ringed around with requirements of the health departments to assure the purity of the supply. Only farms with equipment approved by the health authorities of the marketing area and operated in accordance with their requirements are permitted to market their milk. More than sixty thousand dairies located in the states of New ' York, ■ Connecticut, Massachusetts, Maryland, New Jersey, Pennsylvania and Vermont hold certificates *550of inspection and approval from the Department of Health of the City of New York. More than five hundred receiving plants similarly scattered have been approved for the receiving and shipping of grades A and B milk. Since all milk produced cannot find a ready market' as fluid milk in flush periods, the surplus must move into cream, butter, cheese, milk powder and other more or less nonperishable products. Since these manufactures are in competition' with all similar dairy products, the prices for the milk absorbed into manufacturing processes must necessarily meet the competition of low-cost production areas far removed from the metropolitan centers. The market for fluid milk for use as a food beverage is the most profitable to the producer. Consequently, all producers strive for the fluid milk market. It is obvious that the marketing of fluid milk in New York has contacts at least with the entire national dairy industry. The approval of dairies by the Department of Health of New York Qity, as a condition for the sale of their fluid milk in the metropolitan area, isolates from this general competition a well recognized segment of the entire industry. Since these producers are numerous enough to keep up a volume of fluid milk for New York distribution beyond ordinary requirements, cüt-throat competition even among them would threaten the quality and in the 'end the quantity of fluid milk deemed suitable for New York consumption. Students of the problem generally have apparently recognized a fair division among producers of the fluid milk market and utilization of the rest of the available supply in other dairy staples as an appropriate method of attack for its solution. Order No. 27 was an attempt to make effective such, an arrangement under the authority of the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act.

*551Order No. 27 14 The Secretary of Agriculture found that two-thirds of the milk produced for the New York marketing area actually moves in interstate commerce' and that the remaining one-third produced within the *552State of New York was “physically and inextricably intermingled” with the interstate milk; that all was handled either in the current of interstate commerce or so as to affect, burden and obstruct such interstate commerce in *553milk and its products. An exception was made as to milk regulated by the order of the Commissioner of Agriculture and Markets of the State-of New York. The Secretary further found that prices calculated in accordance with the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937 *554to give this milk a purchasing power equivalent to the parties mentioned in §§ 2 and 8e of that Act were not reasonable in view of the supplies and prices of feeds and other economic conditions which affect the supply and demand for milk. He then fixed a minimum price for milk to be determined from time to time by formula.

By the Order the marketing area is defined as the City of New York and the counties of Nassau, Suffolk and Westchester. A producer is any person producing milk delivered to a handler at a plant approved by a health authority for the receiving of milk for sale in the marketing area. A handler is a person engaged 'in the handling, of milk or cream received at an approved plant for similar sale. “Handler” includes cooperative associations. The administrative sections of the Order setting up a milk administrator and defining his duties are not attacked. Nor are those which classify milk.

Article IV is important since it establishes minimum prices for milk. There are various differentials based upon.use, butter fat content, and distances between the points of production and consumption which it is unnecessary to analyze. For the purposes of this opinion it is sufficient to say, as an example, that the minimum price each handler should pay for milk is fixed by a formula which varies with the butter-price range for 92-score butter at wholesale in the New York market during the 60 days preceding the 25th day of the preceding month. The handlers are required to file reports as to their receipts and utilization of milk of the' various classes. It should be understood, however, that this minimum price is not the amount which the producer receives but the price level or so-called “value” from which is calculated the actual amount in dollars and cents which he is to receive.

By Article VI a uniform price is computed and it is this uniform price which- the producer is actually paid by *555the proprietary (noncooperative) handlers. The uniform price is determined by a computation which iiy'' substance multiplies the amount of milk (classified , ac-■ cording to its use) received by all handlers, less certain quantities of milk permitted to be deducted, by the minimum prices fixed by Article IY for the different classes of milk. From the result various payments and reservations are deducted and the remainder is divided by the total .quantity of milk received. To equalize, handlers pay into the producer settlement fund. While much over-simplified the operation will be made clear by summarizing the provisions of Article VII to require that' handlers shall pay to the producer settlement fund the amount by which their purchased milk multiplied by the minimum prices for the various classes is greater than their purchased milk multiplied by the uniform price. When the handlers’ purchased milk multiplied by the minimum price is less than when it is multiplied by the uniform price, the producer settlement .fund pays them the difference for distribution to their producers. These provisions give uniform prices to all producers, with exceptions to be herein stated, in accordance with the general use of milk for the preceding period.

Other provisions of the Order upon which an attack is • made will be pointed out in the discussion of the particular objections.

Suspension of Order. — It developed at the argument of the causes in this Court that the Secretary of Agriculture on March .18, 1939,15 had suspended Order No. 27 on account of the effect of the decree below on its administration and enforcement. § 8c (16)- (A). Since this suspension is authorized by the statute and the. •Order preserves accrued rights, We. .are. o£ the. .opinion this step does not 'make these proceedings moot. ' Reports *556of their receipts and classified sales of milk, accounting of their pool obligations in the determination of the uniform price and settlement with their producers on the basis of the Order, as well as the payment of money, are sought from the defendants. The controversy over the validity of the Order and the power to enforce its provisions remains.

Adoption of the Order. — Before considering the validity of the Marketing Act and the provisions of the Order under attack, we shall examine the contention of the defendants that the Order was adopted under circumstances which require a court of equity to refuse to enforce it. After dealers had refused or failed to sign the proposed marketing agreement, the Secretary conducted a referendum under § 8c (19) to ascertain whether the issuance of Order No. 27 was approved by two-thirds of the producers, as required by § 8c (9). Vigorous campaigns were waged by both proponents and opponents of the Order. Among the proponents were the League and the Agency. After the vote, the Secretary on August 24, 1938, with the approval of the President, determined that the issuance of the Order was favored by at least two-thirds of the producers, and declared it effective as of September. 1, 1938.16

The defendants base their appeal to the conscience of the chancellor upon matters connected with the referendum which they claim amount to fraud in its adoption. The alleged fraud is said to consist of widespread public misrepresentations to the effect that all producers would receive the same price for their milk and a conspiracy between the League and others to convert the state and national acts into instruments for the creation of a monopoly in large handlers in the sale of fluid milk in the marketing área.

*557The findings supporting the charges of misrepresentation and conspiracy may be summarized as determining that the intervening plaintiffs, the League • and the • Agency, participated actively in proposing, adopting and inducing both producers and handlers to accept the Order. In greater detail, the findings show that the League was instrumental in the organization of. the. Agency; that it has representatives upon the Agency’s Board of Directors; .that the Agency has.acted as an organization for promoting action under both federal and state acts; that both League and Agency published papers which gave vigorous support to the campaign for approval of the' Order. At the time of the hearings the Agency issued an explanatory booklet stating that an equal purchasing price would be paid by all dealers for milk of the same use and that each producer would share equally the benefits of the fluid milk market. Both Agency and League announced repeatedly that handlers would be required to pay a uniform price and that no handler would receive a competitive advantage over the others. The Agency expended over $63,000 between December 1, 1937, and June 1, 1938, and over $45,000 between the latter date and September 1, 1938, the date the order went into effect, as it actively supported the federal-state order program. Voting on the Order took place August 18, 19 and 20. Of 38,627 votes counted as valid in the referendum, 33,663 or 87.1 percent were in favor of the issuance of the Order, and 4,964 or 12.9 percent were opposed. Of the favorable votes, the League cast 22,287.

. Supporting evidence beyond the coordinated activities of the Agency, the League and other cooperatives for the charge of conspiracy to monopolize by securing the adoption of the Order was found by the District Court in the provisions of the Order. Competitive, advantages to cooperatives in the Order were thought by it to indicate an improper influence by them in its drafting. These will *558be discussed later from the point of view of their legality under permissible classification. The court found that the conspiracy to obtain a monopoly was carried out by coercive tactics on .the part of producers, under the leadership of the League and the Agency. These tactics consisted of threats to handlers that if they did not comply with the Order, the producers would withhold delivery of milk. These schemes, the lower court determined, were so successful in securing the drafting, adoption and acceptance of the Order that a conspiracy to monopolize interstate commerce contrary to the Sherman Act was-established. It held that the occurrence of the incidents’ just detailed compelled refusal of the injunction. We do not agree.

While considering the manner of the adoption of the Order, the validity of the Act and the provisions of the Order must be assumed. The Order was submitted to the producers for approval after the hearings specified in the statute. The full text of the Order with explanatory pamphlets was mailed each prospective voter. In the face of this fact, erroneous statements cannot be per- ■ mitted to render the submission futile; There is no evidence, that ,any producer misunderstood. A casual sentence in one of the pamphlets of the Department of Agriculture and a number of other statements in publications of the League and Agency were to the effect that dealers would pay all producers the uniform price for milk. Such assertions need the qualifications given in the Order that they ,are not applicable to milk sold outside the marketing area or to milk handled by cooperatives. The variation from the facts is not immaterial in view of the value or volume of milk involved. But the Order, Article VII, plainly stated that cooperatives were not covered by the payment requirements and it appeared, also, that milk sold outside the marketing area was not *559within its terms. A study of the official form of the Order would have cleared up any misconception created by the language. The Secretary of Agriculture declared that three-fourths of the producers .affected by the Order approved its terms. The litigants do not deny that three-fourths of the voters voted for the institution of the Order. There is no authority in the courts to go behind this conclusion of the Secretary to inquire into the influences which caused the producers to favor the resolution.

The coercion by the League and the.Agency, exercised upon the handlers after the adoption of the Order to force or induce them to acquiesce in its operation, is of the same indirect character as the alleged misrepresentation. It is the partisan coercion of the producer seeking to compel dealer support of the plan by the threat of the use of his economic power over his own milk. The coercion was ineffective upon these defendants. Producers’ organizations urged in their papers and meetings diversion of milk from handlers to influence them to agree to the Order. Süch efforts could not have had an effect on the prior vote of the producers. It is quite true that the League which itself cast two-thirds of the favorable votes was in a position to cast more than one-third of the total qualified vote against the Order. This arises from the provision of the Act, authorizing cooperatives to express the approval or disapproval for all of their members or patrons.17 This is not an unreasonable provision, as the cooperative is the marketing agency of those for whom it votes. If the power is in the Congress to put the order in effect, the manner of the demonstration of further approval is likewise under its control. These associations of producers of milk have a vital interest in the establishment of an efficient marketing system. This ade-*560qüately explains their interest in securing, the adoption of an order believed by them to be favorable for this purpose. If ulterior motives of corporate aggrandizement stimulated their activities, their efforts were not thereby rendered unlawful.18 If the Act and Order are otherwise valid, the fact that théir effect would be to give- cooperatives a monopoly of the market would not violate the Sherman Act or justify the refusal of the injunction.

Correlation of Order and Act. There is another phase of the argument against the Order which is not affected by the validity of the Act or its application in the Order and therefore is ready for disposition before the constitutional questions need be reached. Defendants contend there is no statutory basis for the sections of the Order exempting cooperatives from the payment of the uniform price19' and authorizing payments to them and certain handlers from the producer settlement fund.20

The Government makes the point that none of the defendants, all handlers, can object to these terms of the Order because only producers delivering milk to cooperatives are affected by the exemption of cooperative handlers from the requirement to pay at not less than the uniform price and only producers are affected by the use of the pooled money for §§ 5. and 6 payments to cooperative and other handlers. Although three of the defendants cannot complain of the benefits conferred upon cooperatives, for they are cooperatives, the defendant letter Dairy Company has standing to raise the issue of want of statutory authority to except cooperative handlers from the payment of the uniform price. It is a proprietary corporation, a handler of milk, required by the Order *561to pay uniform prices for the milk it purchases.21 This requirement to pay uniform prices arises from the provisions of Article IV that it shall pay minimum prices. The two are the same except for the deduction of certain service payments. The cooperatives are excepted from the payment. The burden of payment is laid directly upon Jetter while others are excepted. None of the defendants, on the other hand, is in a position to raise the issue of lack of statutory authority for the payments authorized by Article VII, §§ 5 and 6. Whether cooperative or not, the defendant corporations have no financial interest in the producer settlement fund. All defendants pay into, or draw out of, that fund in accord-, anee with their utilization of the milk delivered to them by their patrons. The defendants’ profit or loss depends upon the spread each receives between the class price and sale price. If the deductions from the fund are small or nothing, the patron receives a higher uniform'price but the handler is not affected.22

We now consider whether the Act authorizes the exception of the cooperatives from the uniform payment provisions of Article VII, § 1. This authority, if it exists, is in § 8c (5) (F) of the Act. The earlier paragraphs provide for minimum prices to be paid by handlers to producers and associations of producers, subject to usual quality and location differentials not important here. These would require minimum prices to be paid by cooperatives when, as here, they were handlers under the definition of the Order,23 were it not for the exception of *562these Same, cooperatives under subsection (E): “Nothing . . . shall . . . prevent-a cooperative . . . from . . . making distribution thereof [net proceeds] ... in accordance with the contract between the association and its producers.” This language specifically permits, indeed requires, the Order to except cooperatives from the requirement of paying minimum prices to producers. As the minimum price is paid to the producer through the payment of the uniform price, after equalization in the pool, there is authority in the Act to except the cooperative from the payment of the uniform price.

I. Terms of the Order.

Certain provisions of the Order were found by the District Court to show unconstitutional discrimination against one or more of the defendants. The discrimina-tions of which complaint is made arise from the application to the New York problem of § 8c (5) of the Act relating to milk.

A. Uniform Price. — The Jetter Dairy Company, a proprietary handler, urges that as milk cooperatives need not pay producers a uniform price, it is unreasonably discriminatory and violative of 'the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment to'require it to pay this uniform price. In § 8c (5) (F) there is a definition of the type of cooperative permitted to settle with its members in accordance with the membership contract. The general characteristics of coopératives'are well understood. The Capper-Yolstead Act defines such cooperatives as associations of producers, corporate or otherwise, with or without capital stock, marketing their product for the mutual benefit- of the members as producers with equal voting privileges, restricted dividends on capital employed and dealings limited to 50 percent^ non-member products.24 Different *563treatment has been accorded marketing cooperatives by-state and federal legislation alike.25 Indeed the Secretary is charged by this Act to “accord such recognition and encouragement to producer-owned and producer-controlled cooperative associations as will be in harmony with the policy toward cooperative associations set forth in existing Acts of Congress, and as will tend to promote efficient methods of marketing and distribution.” 26 These agricultural cooperatives are the means by which farmers and stockmen enter into the processing and distribution of their crops and livestock. The distinctions between such cooperatives and business organizations have repeatedly been held to justify different treatment.27 Frost *564v. Corporation Commission28 in’ fact recognized the validity of such classification. The Commission was enjoined from issuing a license for the operation of a cooperative cotton gin,' under a proviso directing it to do so on petition of 100 citizens and taxpayers without the showing of public necessity required for other ginners. The applicant was organized for profit, though dividends were limited, and its membership was not confined to producers. The court thought the distinctions had no reasonable relation to the subject of the legislation, special opportunities for cooperatives. It was said the Court had “no reason to doubt” that the classification was valid as applied to true cooperatives.29

The producer cooperative seeks to return to its members the largest possible portion of the dollar necessarily spent by the consumer for the product with deductions only for modest distribution costs, without profit to the membership cooperative and with limited profit to the stock cooperative. It is organized by producers for their mutual benefit.30 For that reason, it may be assumed that it will seek to distribute the largest amounts to its patrons.

*565The commodity handled by a cooperative corresponds for some purposes to the capital of a business corporation. Either may cut sale prices below cost, one as long as its members will deliver, the other as long as its assets permit. When proprietary corporations lower sales prices, they naturally seek to lower purchase prices. Their profit depends on spread. On the other hand, the cooperative cannot pass the reduction. All the selling price less expense is available for distribution to its patrons. As its. own members bear the burden of price cutting, it was reasonable to exempt it from the payment of the fixed price. The cooperative member measures his return by the market or uniform price the business handler pays. In commodities with the wide market of staple dairy products, quotations are readily available. If distributions do not equal open prices, the cooperators’ reactions would parallel those of stockholders of losing businesses. Neither the Act nor the order protects anyone from lawful competition, nor is it essential that they should do so.31 We do not find an unreasonable discrimination in excepting producers’ cooperatives from the requirement to pay a uniform price.

B. Unpriced Milk. Another discrimination is said to reside in that .part of the Order which limits minimum prices to milk "sold in the marketing area or which passes through a plant in the marketing area.” Other milk, though from the same production area, is “unpriced milk” and does not figure in the computation of the uniform price. Where both priced and unpriced milk are deal'; in by a handler, he must furnish a statement to the producer showing the percentage of his milk paid for at the uniform price.32 The defendants handle only milk which is sold in the marketing area. They assert that an un*566reasonable discrimination results in favor of handlers, such as the League, which market milk both in and outside the marketing area.

The basis of the complaint is that large dealers and cooperative handlers with extensive gathering and distributing facilities are permitted to purchase milk throughout the milk shed at any pricé they please, if the milk does not pass through a plant in the marketing area, and sell it at any price they please, provided the sale is outside the limited New York marketing area. By reason of the fact that milk sells for more in New Jersey than in New York, a greater profit is made by the handler. If he so desires, the handler can use this profit to replace losses on New York area sales and still be in a position to pay the uniform price to producers on pool milk. This is said to create a discrimination against the defendants.

It is possible for the handlers with unpriced milk to use their profits from the profitable extra area trade in the way suggested. It was equally possible for them to do so before the Order. It is a competitive situation which the Order did not create and with which it does not deal. We are of the view that there is no discrimination by reason of this situation.

The District Court found that handlers of unpriced milk “are permitted to blend prices paid or purported to have been paid for such milk sold in other markets, with the uniform price .announced by the Administrator for milk sold in the area, thereby reducing the actual price paid by such handlers, for milk sold in the Metropolitan Area, in competition with milk sold by the defendants.” “If the price figured by the handler for unpriced milk, is lower than its actual market value, the handler, by blending, is thereby permitted to pay -producers for all milk at less than the Order price, and less than the actual value thereof.” It is erroneous, to suppose that by buying some milk at less than the minimum, the *567“actual price” paid for milk sold in the marketing area is reduced. The price paid for all milk sold by. proprietary handlers in that area is the uniform price. Unpriced milk from, the same producer may be bought for less. The average paid the producer may be below the minimum but for the part sold in the marketing area or passing through plants there located the minimum is paid. This is all that justifies the language of the finding that “the handler, by blending, is thereby permitted to pay producers for all milk at less than the Order price. . .

C. Nearby Differentials. Provision is made by the Order for special differentials of 20 cents on milk from certain counties located most favorably to the marketing area.33 This is to enable handlers to pay the producers at these plants.34 The five cent difference is absorbed by the handlers. The Act authorizes such an arrangement. § 8c (5) (A). This was found discriminatory as between producers by the District Court but there was no finding or conclusion of law as to any discrimination against defendants. The District Court was of the opinion this was unfair to these defendants who have no patrons in these counties. Here the defendants urge further advantages from this arrangement to their competitors who have patrons in these counties because near locations, freight differentials considered, have lower transportation costs. The differential increases milk prices to the producers. This payment tends to stimulate production. Larger production means more benefit from the freight advantage to competitors. The discrimination seems fanciful and remote. It would not justify a.court in overturning the Secretary’s determination of the propriety of the differentials on evidence found by the lower court to be substantial. Such an administrative determination carries a presumption of the existence of a state *568of facts justifying the action far too strong to be overturned by such suggestions as are made here.35

II. Constitutionality of the Act.

A. Minimum Prices. The Act authorizes and the Order undertakes the fixing of minimum prices for the purchase of milk “in the current of interstate or foreign commerce, or which directly burdens, obstructs, or affects, interstate or foreign commerce” in milk.36 There is no challenge to the fact that the milk of all four defendants reaches the marketing area through the channels of interstate commerce. Nor is any question raised as to the power of the Congress to regulate the distribution in the area of the wholly intrastate milk. It is recognized that the federal authority covers the sales of this milk, as its marketing is inextricably intermingled with and directly affects the marketing in the area of the milk which moves across state lines.37

The challenge is to the regulation “of the price to be paid upon the sale by a dairy farmer v/ho delivers his milk to some country plant.” It is urged that the sale, a local transaction, is fully completed before any interstate commerce begins and that the attempt to fix the ■ price or other elements of that incident violates the Tenth Amendment. But where commodities are bought for use beyond state lines, the sale is a part of interstate com-*569xnerce.38 We have likewise held that where sales for interstate transportation were commingled with intrastate transactions, the existence of the local activity did not interfere with the federal power to regulate inspection of the whole.39 Activities conducted within state lines do not by this fact alone escape the sweep of the Commerce Clause, Interstate commerce may be dependent upon them.40 Power to establish quotas for interstate marketing gives power to name quotas for that which is to be left within the state of production.41 Where local and foreign milk alike are drawn into a general plan for protecting the interstate commerce in the commodity from the interferences, burdens and obstructions, arising from excessive surplus and the social and sanitary evils of low values, the power of the Congress extends also to the local sales.

This power over commerce when it exists is complete and perfect.42 It has been exercised to fix a wage scale for a limited period,43 railroa’d tariffs44 and fees and charges for live-stock exchanges.45

The authority of the Federal Government over interstate commerce does not differ in extent or character from that retained by the states over intrastate com*570merce. Since Munn v. Illinois, this Court has had occasion repeatedly to give consideration to the action of states in regulating prices.46 Recently, upon a reexamination of the grounds of state power over prices, that power was phrased by this Court to mean that “upon proper occasion and by appropriate measures the state may regulate a business in any of its aspects, including the prices to be charged for the products or commodities it sells.”47

The power of a state to fix the price of milk has been adjudicated by this Court.48 The people of great cities depend largely upon an adequate supply of pure fresh milk. So essential is it for health that the consumer has been willing to forego unrestricted competition from low cost territory to be assured of the producer’s compliance with sanitary requirements, as enforced by the municipal health authorities. It belongs to that category qf commodities that for many years has been subjected to the regulatory power of the state. A thorough exposition of the milk situation in the New York shed was made in the Nebbia, case. There is nothing to add to- what was there said, save to point out that since that decision, we have held that a state cannot prohibit the sale of imported milk where the extra-state purchase price was below the prescribed minimum49 and that a Pennsylvania regulatory *571law, including minimum prices, applied in the absence of federal legislation to milk purchased in Pennsylvania for shipment into the New York marketing area.50 In Hegeman Farms Corp. v. Baldwin,51 this Court sustained again the New York Milk Control Statute against the complaint that the price limits were arbitrary. A variation in prices to be charged the consumer between dealers who had and dealers who had not well advertised trade names was upheld.52 The power enjoyed by the states to regulate the prices for handling and selling commodities within their internal commerce 53 rests with the Congress in the commerce between the states. .

B. Equalization Pool. — In order to equalize the prices received by producers, handlers are required to clear their purchases through the producer settlement fund. Payments into and withdrawals from this fund depend upon the “value” of the milk received which is fixed by the Order at different prices governed by the use made by the handler of the purchased milk and upon whether his obligations to producers are greater or less than the uniform price due the producers under the scheme. The result of the use of the device of an equalization pool is that each producer, dealing with a proprietary handler, gets a uniform or weighted average price for his milk, with differentials for quality, location or other usual market variations, irrespective of the manner of its use. The Act, § 8c (5) (B) (ii) and (C) and the Order, Articles IV, VI and VII, authorize such an adjustment.

The defendants’ objection to the equalization pool, here considered, is not to the disbursements from the fund for expenses of standby or marketing services *572authorized by Article VII, §§ 5 and 6, concerning which we hold the handler has no standing to complain. It is to the alleged deprivation of liberty and property .accomplished by the pooling requirement in taking away from the defendants their right to acquire milk from their patrons at the minimum class price, according to its use, and forcing the handlers to pay their surplus, over the uniform price, to the equalization pool instead of to their patrons. This argument assumes the validity of price regulation, as such, but denies the constitutionality of the pooling arrangement because handlers are not at liberty to pay the producer in accordance with the use of the producer’s milk but müst distribute the surplus to others whose milk was resold less advantageously. It is urged that to carry this principle of contribution to its logical conclusion would mean that the wages of the employed should be shared with the unemployed; the highly paid, with the underpaid; and the receipts of the able, the fortunate and the diligent, with the incompetent, the unlucky and the drone.

No such exaggerated equalization of wealth and opportunity is proposed. The pool is only a device reasonably adapted to allow regulation of the interstate market upon terms which minimize the results of the restrictions. It is ancillary to the price regulation designed, as is the price provision, to foster, protect and encourage interstate commerce by smoothing out the difficulties of the surplus and cut-throat competition which burdened this marketing. In Mulford v. Smith,54 we made it clear that volume of commodity movement might be controlled or discouraged. As the Congress would have, clearly, the right to permit only limited amounts of milk to move in interstate commerce, we are of the opinion it might permit the movement on terms of pool settlement here provided.

*573Common funds for equalizing risks are not unknown and have not been considered violative of due process. The pooling principle was upheld in workmen’s compensation,55 bank deposit insurance, 56 and distribution of benefits in the Transportation Act.57

The defendants rely particularly upon Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Utilities Corp.,58 and Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton R. Co.59 In the Thompson case, the Texas Railroad Commission ordered proration of gas production in the Panhandle. It was assumed that pro-ration to prevent waste and protect correlative rights in a .pool was valid but it was held that the proration order in issue was for none of these purposes. It was for the “sole purpose ... to compel those [with market outlets] ... to purchase gas from potential producers” who have no market. This was not deemed to be reasonably related to the conservation of gas or the protection of correlative rights. In the Retirement Board case, the pooling principle was involved but was found to be invalid because the burdens on the roads were not equalized with the benefits. Entry on service was made at different age levels for different roads. Employees seventy or older were required to retire. Some roads had none. Solvent and insolvent roads were liable alike. All carriers were treated as a single employer. It was these provisions, deemed unequal, which led to the conclusion that the manner of pooling of funds denied due process. In this case, the pooling has differentials to cover the variations of quality and location.

*574C. Delegation. — There are three issues of delegation presented: (1) the delegation of authority to the Secretary of Agriculture to establish marketing areas; (2) the delegation of authority to producers to approve a marketing order without an agreement of handlers; and (3) the delegation of authority to cooperatives to cast the votes of producer patrons.

From the earliest days the Congress has been compelled to leave to the administrative officers of the government authority to determine facts which were to put legislation into effect and the details of regulations which would implement the more general enactments. It is well settled, therefore, that it is no argument against the constitutionality of an act to say that it delegates broad powers to executives to determine the details of any legislative scheme. This necessary authority has never been denied.60 In dealing with legislation involving questions of economic adjustment, each enactment must be considered to determine whether it states the purpose which the Congress seeks to accomplish and the standards by which that purpose is to be worked out with sufficient exactness to enable those affected to understand these limits. Within these tests, the Congress needs specify only so far as is reasonably practicable.61 The present Act, we believe, satisfies these tests.

1. Delegation to the Secretary of .Agriculture. — The purpose of the Act is “to establish and maintain such orderly marketing conditions for agricultural commodities in interstate commerce as- will establish prices to *575farmers at a level that will give agricultural commodities a purchasing power with respect to articles that farmers buy, equivalent to the purchasing power of agricultural commodities in the base period.” To accomplish this, the Secretary of Agriculture is directed to issue orders, whenever he has reason to'believe the issuance of an order will tend to effectuate the declared policy of #the act. Unlike the language of the National Industrial Recovery Act condemned in the Schechter case, page 538, the tests here to determine the purpose and the powers dependent upon that conclusion are defined. In the Recovery Act the 'Declaration of Policy was couched in most general terms.62 In this Act it is to restore parity prices, § 2. Under the Recovery Act, general welfare might be sought through codes of' any industry, formulated to express standards of fair competition for the businesses covered. Here the terms of orders are limited to the specific provisions, minutely set out in § 8c (5) and (7). While considerable flexibility is provided by § 8c (7) (D), *576it gives opportunity only to include provisions auxiliary to those definitely specified.

The Secretary is not permitted freedom of choice as to the commodities which he may attempt to aid by an order. The Act, § 8c (2), limits him to milk, fresh fruits except apples, tobacco, fresh vegetables, soybeans and naval stores. The Act authorizes a marketing agreement and order to be issued for such production or marketing regions or areas as are practicable. A city milkshed seems homogeneous. This standard of practicality is a limit on the power to issue orders. It determines when an order may be promulgated. .

It is further to be observed that the Order could not be and was not issued until after the hearing and findings as required by § 8c (4). Public hearings were held at Albany, Malone, Syracuse, Elmira, and New York from May 16 to June 7, 1938, with four days’ recess. Nearly three thousand pages of testimony were introduced, eighty-eight documentary exhibits and some twenty briefs by interested parties were filed. On July 23, 1938, the Secretary, in the Federal Register, notified the public of his findings and the terms of the Order and again invited comment. Numerous parties again filed briefs. A right by statute is given handlers to object to the Secretary to any provision of an order as not “in acordance with law,” with the privilege of appeal to the courts. § 8c (15) (A) and.(B). Even though procedural safeguards cannot validate an unconstitutional delegation, they do furnish protection against an arbitrary use of properly delegated authority.63

A further provision of the Act is to be noted as it was employed as a standard to determine the minimum price. This is § 8c (18). Acting under this section, the Secretary fixed a fluctuating minimum price based upon wholesale butter prices in New York. While it is true that the. *577determination of price under this section has a less definite standard than the parity tests of §§ 2 and 8e, we cannot say that it is beyond the power of the Congress to leave this determination to a designated administrator, with the standards named. The Secretary must have' first determined the prices in accordance with § 2 and § 8e, that is, the prices that will give the commodity a purchasing power equivalent to that of the base period, considering the price and súpply of feed and other pertinent economic conditions affecting the milk market in the area. If he finds the price so determined unreasonable, it is to be fixed at a level which will reflect such factors, provide adequate quantities of wholesome milk and be in the public interest. This price cannot be determined by mathematical formula but the standards give ample indications of the various factors to be considered by the Secretary.

2. Delegation to Producers. — Under § 8o (9) (B) of the Act it is provided that any order shall become effective notwithstanding the failure of 50 percent of the handlers to approve a similar agreement, if the Secretary of Agriculture with the approval of the President determines, among other things, that the issuance of the order is approved by two-thirds of the producers interested or by interested producers of tw.o-thirds of the volume produced for the market of the specified production area. By subsection 19 it is provided that fori the purpose of ascertaining whether the issuance of such order is approved “the Secretary may conduct a referendum among producers.” The objection is made that this is an unlawful delegation to producers of the legislative power to put .an order into effect in a market. In considering this question, we must assume that the Congress had the power.to put this Order into effect without the approval of anyone. ' Whether producer approval by election is *578necessary or not, a question we reserve, a requirement of such approval would not be an invalid delegation.64

3. Authorization of Cooperatives to Cast the Votes of Producer Patrons. — This objection, too, falls before the answering argument that inasmuch as Congress could place the Order in effect without any vote, it is permissible for it to provide for approval or disapproval in such way or manner as it may choose.

Cooperatives in the Equalization Fund. — The defendant, Central New York Cooperative Association, denies liability under Articles VI, VII and VIII of the Order on the ground that it is not liable to pay its net pool obligation into the administrative fund or to meet the expenses of administration. The asserted reason for its freedom from liability is that it is a cooperative composed of milk producers and distributes the milk of its members and others as agent.

The cooperative owns no farms. Its members are dairy farmers. By their contract they agree “to deliver-. . . all . . . milk produced . . . which said milk is to be marketed and distributed by the [cooperative] . . .” The latter “agrees to pay ... for the milk ... a price . . . based upon the amount received . . . less the expenses . . .” Nonmembers’ milk is marketed under the same contract. The cooperative'- leases receiving and distributing facilities from a business corporation.' The milk is received by the. cooperative at receiving plants and shipped to the city depot. It distributes through other business corporations ^hich are wholly-owned subsidiaries of the cooperative. These distributing subsidiaries use the leased physical facilities under verbal contracts with the cooperative. The cooperative receives the net amoupt from the sales ahd distributes to its patrons under license from the Director of the Division of *579Milk Control of New York permitting the marketing in the manner described.

Section 8c (5) (A) authorizes an order to classify milk and fix minimum prices which all handlers shall pay for milk purchased from producers.' Section 8c (5) (C) authorizes the equalization pool and the handlers’ payment to this settlement fund. It is urged that cooperatives which merely act as agents for their members are not included in handlers purchasing from producers. This is said to be definitely shown by the provisions of § 8c (5) (F) providing that nothing contained in the subsection shall be construed to prevent a Capper-Yolstead cooperative from making distribution to its “producers in accordance with the contract.” The Order defines a handler as including a cooperative association “with respect to any milk received from producers at any plant operated by such association or with respect to any milk which it causes to be delivered”' to other handlers. Under the provisions of the Order, Article VII, §§ 8 and 9, cooperar tive handlers as other handlers equalize their purchases by payment into the producer settlement fund, even though they, are not required to pay the uniform price to their producers by reason of the exception of Article VII, § 1, and the provisions of § 8c (5) (F), as explained at page 561.

Cooperative contracts are of two general types, sale and agency.65 The Central New York Cooperative operates under the agency type.

It is obvious that the use of the word “purchased” in the Act, § 8c (5) (A) and (C), would not exclude the “sale” type of cooperative. When § 8c (5) (F) was drawn, however, it was made to apply to both the “sale” and “agency” type without distinction. This would indicate there had been no intention to distinguish between the two types by (A) and (C). The section which au*580thorizes all orders, § 8c (1), makes no distinction. The orders are to be applicable to “processors, associations of producers, and others engaged in the handling” of commodities. The reports on the bill show no effort to differentiate.66. Neither do the debates in Congress. The statutory provisions for equalization of the burdens of surplus would be rendered nugatory by the exception of “agency” cooperatives. The administrative construction has been to include such organizations as handlers.67 With this we agree. As here used the word “purchased” means “acquired for marketing.” Subsection (A) cannot be construed as freeing agents, cooperative or proprietary, from the requirement to account at the minimum prices for milk handled.

As a corollary the contention is made also by' Central Cooperative that no cooperative may be required to pay its surplus receipts over uniform prices into the equalization fund. This, too, is based upon a construction of § 8c (5 ) (P) as permitting a cooperative to make settlement with its members in accordance with the terms of its own contract with them. If the cooperative members were freed of the burden of carrying their proportion of milk going to manufacturing use, the discrimina-, tion in their favor would be most strongly marked. Such a construction is not required. Cooperatives are covered by § 8c (1) ,and (5) (A) and (B), and by the provisions of the Order, except as, to the payment of the uniform price. Any payments below the uniform price fall ón their members. We are of the view that the administrative construction is correct and that the “net proceeds” of (F) refer to the result of the cooperative sales in the marketing area after complying with the equalization requirements.

*581The defendant, Central New York Cooperative Association, raises for itself a final point. In determining the net pool obligation of any handler for milk received from producers,68 the handler is authorized to subtract pro rata out of each class from the milk involved in the pool “the quantity of milk received from the handler’s own farm.” We have determined that this cooperative, though marketing milk under an agency contract with its members, is a handler subject to .the Act and Order. The cooperative argues that as its members, farmers, would not need to account to the pool for their personal sales to consumers, the cooperative, being utilized as an agent to 'market the farmers’ milk, is under no obligation to contribute to equalization. As the cooperative does not have its own fárm but is itself a handler under the Act, it must pay into the producer settlement fund.

Inasmuch as all the defendants in these appeals are handling milk in interstate commerce, the petition for the enforcement of Official Order No. 126, issued under c. 383 of the Laws of 1937 of the State of New York, concerning milk not covered by Order No. 27 of the. Secretary of Agriculture, should be dismissed.

The order of the District Court in Nos. 771, 827 and 828 is reversed and the causes are remanded to that Court with instructions to enter an order specifically enforcing up to the time of suspension the provisions of Order No. 27, issued by the Secretary of Agriculture August 15,1938, regulating the handling of milk in the New York marketing area, as to all the defendants and enjoining defendants, their officers, agents and servants, from further violation of the Order.

The order of the District Court m dismissing the petition of Holton V. Noyes, as Commissioner of Agriculture and Markets of the State of New York, is affirmed..